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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the effect of economic growth and government spending on the 
environment using a panel of 71 countries for the time period 1970-2008. In 
particular, we test the hypothesis of the existence of an inverted U-shaped 
relationship between economic performance and pollution, as well as the hypothesis 
of a negative direct relationship between fiscal spending and pollution. To take into 
account that environmental degradation may respond to changes in income and 
government spending with a time lag, due to technological and institutional reasons, 
we apply appropriate dynamic econometric methods. We report the estimates for 
both the short-run and long-run effects on two different air pollutants, namely SO2 
and CO2, distinguishing the results for different levels of economic development. 
Policy implications range depending on the level of income of the considered 
countries. 
 
Keywords:  Government expenditure; economic growth; environment; dynamics.  
 
JEL Classifications:  H50; E60; Q53; Q54; Q56. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This research has been co-financed by the European Union (European Social Fund – 
ESF) and Greek national funds through the Operational Program "Education and Lifelong 
Learning" of the National Strategic Reference Framework (NSRF) - Research Funding 
Program: Heracleitus II. Investing in knowledge society through the European Social 
Fund
 
1. Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is twofold, namely to examine the effect of 
economic growth as well as that of government expenditure on environmental 
degradation, taking into account the dynamic nature of these relationships. The 
environmental Kuznets curve (hereafter EKC) hypothesis posits that in the early 
stages of economic development environmental degradation will increase until a 
certain level of income is reached and then environmental improvement will occur 
(Gross and Krugman, 1995). On the other hand, government expenditure has recently 
expanded in many countries to alleviate the adverse effects of the recent economic 
crisis, with a large fraction of GDP spent by governments affecting a variety of 
economic variables and prosperity in general. A recent strand of literature suggests 
that government spending is an important determinant of environmental quality 
(Lopez et al., 2011, Halkos and Paizanos, 2013; Galinato and Islam, 2014).  
According to Halkos (2003) EKC studies identify several factors as the most 
important in determining the inverted-U shape of the curve. In particular these 
factors include, improvements in environmental quality occurring from advances in 
production technology, the exportation of ‘dirty industry’ to less developed 
countries, the role of preferences and regulation on the emissions profile of polluters, 
the better institutional set up in the form of credible property rights, regulations and 
good governance which may create public awareness against environmental 
degradation  and finally, the technological link between the consumption of a desired 
good and the abatement of its undesirable by-products in the form of pollution.  
On the other hand, the mechanisms through which government expenditure 
and environment interact with each other are investigated in theoretical papers by 
Heyes (2000), Lawn (2003) and Sim (2006). Higher government expenditure is more 
likely to include redistributive transfers, which result to increased income equality 
and thus to higher demand for environmental quality. Moreover, if the environment 
is a luxury public good, it is likely that it will only be demanded when the demand 
for other public goods has been satisfied, i.e. at large levels of government size 
(Frederik and Lundstrom, 2001). Lopez et al. (2011) identify four mechanisms by 
which the level and composition of fiscal spending may affect pollution levels1, 
namely the scale (increased environmental pressures due to more economic growth), 
composition (increased human capital intensive activities instead of physical capital 
intensive industries that harm the environment more), technique (due to higher labor 
efficiency) and income (where increased income raises the demand for improved 
environmental quality) effects.  
However, in examining the aforementioned relationships their dynamic 
nature should be taken into account. In particular, it is highly unlikely that the above 
effects of income and government spending on the environment occur 
instantaneously (Halkos, 2003; Lopez et. al., 2011) which may be the case for several 
reasons. For example, technological advances that usually accompany economic 
development may take several years until fully implemented and employed by 
industries. In addition, for psychological reasons and as a result of the force of habit 
(inertia), industries and consumers may not alter their production methods and 
behaviour immediately following a technological advance or a distributional effect 
from a change in public spending, a result that may also be augmented by imperfect 
knowledge. Finally, one may also expect institutional reasons to contribute to the 
existence of lags in the examined relationships.  
                                                          
1 In particular, they examine the effect of the share of public goods in total government expenditure on 
pollution. 
Given this background, our purpose is to investigate firstly how increases in 
income and government spending affect pollution at given income levels in the short-
run and then to estimate how this changes influence environmental quality in the 
long-term. 
To the best of our knowledge the present paper is the first that explicitly 
studies the short-run as well as the long-run effects of both economic development 
and government expenditure on the environment. For that reason, we estimate an 
augmented EKC equation, employing a sample of 71 countries covering the period 
1970-2008 for two air pollutants (sulfur dioxide, SO2 and carbon dioxide, CO2). In 
estimating the proposed model we take into account the dynamic nature of the 
relationships examined, by employing appropriate econometric methods for the 
estimation of dynamic panels.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the 
data used in the analysis and section 3 discusses the proposed econometric models. 
The empirical results are reported in section 4 while the final section concludes the 
paper.  
 
2. Data 
Our sample consists of 71 countries2 with a full set of SO2, CO2, GDP/c and 
share of government expenditure, for the period 1970-2008. The analysis for SO2 
takes place up to the year 2003 because of limited availability of data on this 
                                                          
2Albania, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, 
China, Colombia, Denmark, Djibouti, Equador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Ghana, 
Greece, Guatemala, Guinea Bissau, Honduras, Hungary, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, 
Jordan, Kenya, Lebanon, Liberia, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, 
Qatar, Romania, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, 
Thailand, Trinidad, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay 
pollutant after that period. The data for SO2 and CO2 are from Stern (2005) and 
Boden et. al. (2011) respectively, the data on national income from Maddison (2010) 
and finally the data on government share of income were collected from the Penn 
World Table (2009). The database consists of up to 2,698 observations per variable.  
Data on emissions of the two pollutants were used rather than their 
concentrations, to avoid dependence of results on geographic location characteristics 
and atmospheric conditions. An important distinction between the two pollutants that 
has to do with their atmospheric life characteristics is their geographical range of 
effect (Cole, 2007). Considering that two-thirds of SO2 moves away from the 
atmosphere within 10 days after its emission, its impact is mainly local or regional 
and thus, historically, sulfur dioxide has been subject to regulation. In contrast, CO2 
has not been regulated by governments, since its atmospheric life varies from 50 to 
200 years and hence its impact is global.  
Moreover, the sources of pollution vary by pollutant. The main sources of 
SO2 emissions are electricity generation and industrial processes. On the other hand, 
apart from energy transformation and industry, an important source of CO2 emissions 
is transport. Apparently SO2 pollution is characterized as production-generated, while 
CO2 emissions are a mix between production and consumption–generated pollution. 
This distinction is important since the mechanism by which government expenditure 
size affects consumption pollution is likely to differ compared to production 
pollution. SO2 emissions can be decreased by reducing consumption of fossil fuels 
(especially high-sulfur content coal), by using smoke-scrubbing equipment in power 
plants and by increasing energy efficiency. However, in consumption related 
pollutants the use and influence of environmental policies is more difficult, since the 
main tool to reduce these is the implementation of environmental taxes, which are 
often avoided as they are not politically popular.  
 
3. Methodology 
To establish the specification between air pollution and GDP/c, Box-Cox 
tests have been performed to test linearity against logarithmic functional forms. In 
addition, implementation of the Akaike and Bayesian information criteria indicated 
that the appropriate use of powers of the income variable is three, thus we use a cubic 
specification. In addition, employing greater powers of the income variable leads to 
multicollinearity among the explanatory variables. Specifically, findings of the tests 
suggest the following model which represents a conventional cubic formulation of 
the EKC, augmented by the lagged share of government expenditure over income:  
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where subscripts i and t represent country and time respectively and all variables are 
expressed in natural logarithms, unless otherwise stated.  
The income variable and its powers in (1) control for scale effects. The term 
iµ   is a country effect which can be fixed or random, tζ  is a time effect common to 
all countries and itε  is a disturbance term with the usual desirable properties. 
Following the terminology used to classify the pollution effects in the trade literature, 
the coefficient on the government expenditure variable captures the composition, 
income and part of the technique effect.  
 
 
3.1 Econometric issues and estimation 
In estimating equation (1) we must take into account the unobserved 
heterogeneity across countries. The standard approach is to use fixed and random 
effects, hereafter FE and RE respectively, model formulations with the choice 
depending on the assumption adopted about the correlation between the cross-section 
specific error-component and the explanatory variables. When such correlation is 
present, then RE estimators are not consistent and efficient and the use of FE is more 
appropriate. For instance, in the pollutants equations these country-specific 
characteristics may include differences in climate, geography and fossil fuels 
endowments, all of them potentially correlated with emissions (Leitao, 2010). 
Additionally, it is very likely that country unobserved characteristics are correlated 
with income and the other explanatory variables, implying that FE estimation is 
preferred. This assumption is supported by the use of Hausman test, in which the RE 
model was rejected in favor of the FE model, for equation (1) in all cases. 
Since the balanced panel data used in this paper consists of large N and T 
dimensions, non-stationarity is important, hence in estimating the models we are 
particularly concerned about the dynamic misspecification of the pollutants 
equations. In particular, if we rely on a static model, then all adjustments to any 
shock occur within the same time period in which they occur, but this could be 
justified only in equilibrium or if the adjustment mechanism is rapid. However, 
according to Perman and Stern (1999) this is extremely unlikely and on the contrary, 
it is expected that the return to long-run equilibrium emission levels is a rather slow 
process.  
To estimate a non-stationary dynamic panel we employ the dynamic fixed 
effects (DFE) estimator developed by Pesaran and Smith (1995) and Pesaran et al. 
(1997, 2004). In DFE estimation we assume that intercepts differ across countries but 
that the long-run coefficients are equal across countries. However, if equality of the 
slope coefficients does not hold in practice, this technique yields inconsistent 
estimators. This assumption is tested using a Hausman test.  
For equation (1), adopting the formalization by Blackburne III and Frank 
(2007), we set-up an initial general autoregressive-distributed lag model AD 
(p,q1,…,qk) of the form:  
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where number of countries 1, 2,...,i N= ; number of periods 1, 2,...,t T= , for 
sufficiently large T; itK  a 1k ×  vector of explanatory variables including  
government expenditure and income variables; and iµ  a country-specific effect.  
If the variables in equation (2) are integrated of order one (that is I(1)) and 
cointegrated, then the error term is an I(0) process for all i . A principle feature of 
cointegrated variables is their responsiveness to any deviation from the long-run 
equilibrium. Hence, it is possible to specify an error correction model in which 
deviations from the long-run equilibrium affect the short-run dynamics of the 
variables. The error correction equation is formed as: 
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Nonlinearity in the parameters requires that the models are estimated using 
maximum likelihood.  
Another econometric concern for equation (1) is the bias occurring from the 
potential endogeneity between government spending and pollution, since government 
spending often increases with pollution because governments implement ecological 
taxes. Moreover, as already mentioned, the impact of government expenditure may 
not occur instantaneously. For this reason, we use the lagged share of government 
expenditure which also may mitigate bias from reverse causality. 
3.2 Identifying the short- and long-run effects 
Including more than one lags of the government expenditure and income 
variables in (1) to capture dynamics may result in multicollinearity. Thus, we employ 
the Koyck transformation of estimating distributed lag models. In particular, we 
assume that the subsequent effects of government expenditure and income are all of 
the same sign as their short-run counterparts and that they decline geometrically each 
year following:  
t
it λββκ 0=                                                            (4) 
In addition we assume that, after a change in government expenditure and 
income, the speed of adjustment rates of the pollutants’ emissions to their long-run 
equilibrium are similar and thus we propose the model: 
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where itθ  = εit – λ εit-1. 
Coefficient β1 that will be obtained from the estimation of equation (5) can be 
interpreted as the short-run elasticity of government spending on pollution, while the 
marginal effect of the income variable may be interpreted as the short-run income 
elasticity. Long run elasticity of government spending is given by β1 / (1-λ) while 
the long-run income elasticity can be obtained, respectively, by dividing the short-
run elasticity of income by the term (1-λ). 
4. Results 
Before turning to the estimation of per capita pollution equations we should examine 
the time series properties of the main variables used. Testing for unit roots in panel 
data requires both the asymptotic behavior of the time-series dimension T, and the 
cross-section dimension N, to be taken into consideration. Since the panel data set we 
examine consists of both N →∞ and T →∞  dimensions, the tests of stationarity 
performed are based on the Fisher-type Phillips-Peron unit root test. The test allows 
heterogeneity of the autoregressive parameter and although in its general form does 
not control for cross-sectional dependence, is more powerful than Levin et al. (2002) 
in that case3. Table 1a presents the results of the Phillips-Perron unit root tests on the 
variables of interest. There is evidence against stationarity in levels, since in all cases 
our variables are I(1). 
Table 1a:  Panel data unit root tests 
Variable no trend 
c-s means 
no trend 
minus c-s 
means 
with trend  
c-s means 
with trend 
minus c-s 
means  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log SO2/c 0.673 0.707 0.316 0.604 
∆(Log SO2/c) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Log CO2/c 0.049 0.361 0.273 0.880 
∆(Log CO2/c) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Log Government share lagged 0.224 0.034 0.479 0.043 
∆(Log Government share lagged) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Log GDP/c 1.000 0.925 1.000 1.000 
∆(Log GDP/c) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Log GDP/c2 1.000 0.975 1.000 1.000 
∆(Log GDP/c) 2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Log GDP/c3 1.000 0.998 1.000 1.000 
∆(Log GDP/c) 3 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Note: Fisher-type Phillips-Perron unit root tests performed on each panel including zero or one 
Newey-West lag.  All values reported are probabilities. C-s means stands for cross-sectional means. 
Additionally, application of the DFE method requires that the variables in the 
model are cointegrated meaning that there is a long-run relationship among them. 
                                                          
3
 We also compute the mean of the series across panels and subtract this mean from the series (columns 
2 and 4 in Table 1a) to mitigate the impact of cross-sectional dependence.  
 
Table 1b presents the Pedroni and the Kao (Engle based) cointegration tests for the 
two pollutants equations. We reject the null hypothesis of no-cointegration at the 
conventional statistical significance level of 0.05 in six of the eight cases for the SO2 
equation and in five cases for CO2. However, in terms of raw power of the statistics 
for relatively small values of T the rho and panel-v statistics are the most 
conservative and show a tendency to not reject (Pedroni, 2004), suggesting that 
evidence of cointegration is even stronger than that depicted in Table 1b.    
         Table 1b:  Pedroni residual cointegration test for the two pollution equations 
 SO2/c CO2/c 
 Statistic Probability Statistic Probability 
Panel v-statistic 4.331 0.000 7.118 0.000 
Panel rho-statistic 7.799 1.000 0.181 0.572 
Panel PP-statistic -8.798 0.000 -2.623 0.004 
Panel ADF-statistic -22.60 0.000 -9.173 0.000 
Group rho-statistic 12.02 1.000 3.886 0.999 
Group PP-statistic -8.238 0.000 -0.757 0.225 
Group ADG-statistic -25.18 0.000 -9.576 0.000 
Kao test (Engle based) -33.88 0.000 -34.29 0.000 
 
Table 2 provides the estimates of per capita pollution emissions. In our 
model, as mentioned, according to the Hausman test, the FE estimation is preferred 
to RE. Hence, for each pollutant we report FE and DFE estimates. Dynamics are 
taken into account in the estimates reported in columns 2 and 4 of the Table. 
Comparing the Mean Group (MG) and Pooled Mean Group (PMG) estimators, with 
the use of a Hausman test, we found that the PMG estimator, the efficient estimator 
under the null hypothesis, is preferred indicating that the assumption of equal long-
run coefficients across panels is more appropriate in our panel. Additionally, another 
application of the Hausman test suggests that the simultaneous equation bias between 
the error term and the lagged dependent variable is minimal in our panel and we may 
conclude that the DFE model is the most appropriate. In addition, the error correction 
term in the DFE estimator for both pollutants is statistically significant at the 1% 
level for both pollutants, suggesting that taking into account dynamics is necessary.   
        Table 2: Estimates of per capita pollution emissions for the world sample 
  SO2/c                  CO2/c 
 FE DFE FE DFE 
Log government share lagged  -0.379** -0.663** -0.052 -0.070 
 (0.155) (0.287) (0.086) (0.121) 
Log GDPc -27.31** -22.52 -17.12*** -22.74*** 
 (11.44) (13.76) (4.889) (7.805) 
(Log GDPc)2 3.849** 3.284* 2.269*** 2.943*** 
 (1.444) (1.716) (0.586) (0.914) 
(Log GDPc)3 -0.174*** -0.153** -0.094*** -0.121*** 
 (0.060) (0.071) (0.023) (0.035) 
Constant 57.74*  39.36***  
 (29.67)  (13.29)  
Error correction term   -0.137***  -0.118*** 
  (0.055)  (0.016) 
Turning Points 380/6,673 298/5,502 419/23,242 573/19,228 
R2  0.305  0.392  
F test 0.000  0.000  
Hausman FE v. RE 0.000  0.000  
Hausman MG v. PMG  0.510  0.527 
Hausman PMG v. DFE  0.010  0.997 
Nobs/Countries 2,190/71 2,119/71 2,698/71 2,627/71 
         Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. All tests’ values reported are probabilities. 
         *Significant at 10%.          **Significant at 5%          ***Significant at 1%. 
 
Both pollutants have a significant inverted N-shaped cubic relationship with 
per capita income in all estimates (for similar findings see for example Cole, 2007). 
Interestingly, taking into account dynamics in the DFE estimates produces slightly 
lower turning points for both pollutants. However, the initial turning point is 
particularly low in all estimates that essentially for the in sample income 
observations the derived EKCs have the conventional quadratic form. 
On the other hand, a negative direct effect of government share of income on 
pollution is estimated by all models. Concentrating on DFE estimates the 
government share of income possesses a negative relationship with SO2/c which is 
significant at 5%, however the effect on CO2/c is insignificant. In particular, an 
increase of government expenditure by 1%, ceteris paribus, may result in a 0.663% 
reduction of SO2/c emissions but has no effect on CO2/c emissions. 
In Table 3 we present the estimates of the pollution equations employing the 
Koyck transformation. Results are presented for the whole sample, as well as for two 
sub-samples, namely the OECD group of countries and one with the rest countries of 
our sample that do not belong in OECD. It is interesting to note that the estimated 
coefficients of the lagged pollutant variables are significant in all cases at the 1% 
level. In addition, for SO2 the coefficient of the lagged pollution variable greatly 
differs between the two subgroups, suggesting different adjustment rates and return 
to equilibrium pollution levels after a change in the explanatory variables.  
Table 3: Estimates of per capita pollution emissions using Koyck transformation 
                                   SO2/c   CO2/c 
 World OECD Non-OECD World OECD Non-OECD 
Log government share lagged  -0.090** -0.082** -0.112** -0.016 -0.023 -0.015 
 (0.039) (0.030) (0.553) (0.014) (0.017) (0.017) 
Log GDPc -3.569** -0.084*** 1.301* -2.707** 0.848** -2.632** 
 (1.769) (0.022) (0.660) (1.076) (7.805) (1.174) 
(Log GDPc)2 0.514**  -0.076* 0.358*** -0.044** 0.345** 
 (0.226)  (0.039) (0.126) (0.020) (0.139) 
(Log GDPc)3 -0.024**   -0.015***  -0.014** 
 (0.014)   (0.005)  (0.005) 
Log SO2/c lagged 0.857
*** 0.985*** 0.771*** 0.870*** 0.896*** 0.864*** 
 (0.054) (0.010) (0.089) (0.014) (0.021) (0.016) 
Constant 7.410* 0.913*** -6.386* 6.332** -3.953** 6.160* 
 (4.428) (0.249) (3.095) (2.996) (1.840) (3.255) 
       
Turning Points 387/4,103 - 5,215 485/16,751 15,312 412/33,089 
Long-run gov. expend. elasticity -0.629 -5.466 -0.489 - - - 
Short-run income elasticity -0.019 -0.084 0.105 0.131 0.006 0.197 
Long-run income elasticity -0.133 -5.600 0.459 1.008 0.058 1.447 
R2  0.821 0.963 0.687 0.878 0.902 0.875 
F test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Hausman FE v. RE 0.000 0.032 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Nobs/Countries 2,190/71 828/26 1,362/45 2,698/71 988 /26 1,710/45 
 Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. All tests’ values reported are probabilities. Short-run income 
elasticity, as  well as long-run income and government expenditure elasticities are calculated at the sample 
median level of per capita  income of each sub-sample which are $4,565, $14,319 and $2,605 for the World, 
OECD and Non-OECD groups,  respectively. 
          *Significant at 10%.            **Significant at 5%           ***Significant at 1%. 
 
Consistent with the previous results, the estimated effect of government 
expenditure is negative in all cases but remains significant only for SO2. However, 
the specification of the pollution equation depends on the sample of countries used. 
In particular, for SO2, there is evidence for an inverted N-shaped EKC in the full 
sample and for a quadratic form for the Non-OECD countries; however results 
suggest a monotonic relationship for the OECD countries. On the other hand, for 
CO2 the derived EKC is inverted N-shaped for the World and Non-OECD countries 
and inverted U-shaped for the OECD sample. 
The estimated long-run elasticities of government expenditure on SO2 are 
greater than their short-run counterparts in all cases. Focusing on SO2, the estimated 
short-run elasticities of government share are of similar magnitude among the 
different groups, however the same does not hold for the long-run elasticities. The 
latter are much greater, in absolute value, for OECD countries suggesting that a 
sustained increase of 1% in government share, ceteris paribus, leads to a long-run 
reduction of 5.466% in SO2 emissions, a result which is more than 10 times greater 
than for the Non-OECD countries. This relationship is depicted in Figure 1 where the 
partial effect of an 1% increase in government expenditure on SO2 is shown for the 
following 10 years, for each of the three country groups. 
    Figure 1: The partial effects of government share on SO2/c 
 
 
The elasticities of income on SO2 are negative for the world and OECD 
countries group but positive in the Non-OECD countries. In particular, the estimate 
of the long run elasticity of income on SO2 for the median income OECD country 
implies that following a 1% sustained increase in income, ceteris paribus, there will 
be a 5.6% reduction in SO2 emissions. On the contrary, a 1% sustained increase in 
income, ceteris parbus, is estimated to cause a 0.459% increase in SO2 emissions in a 
Non-OECD country. For the CO2 emissions the income elasticities are positive in all 
samples. However, both in the short- and long-run the effect is much larger in the 
Non-OECD countries group. Figures 2 and 3 depict these relationships. 
Figure 2: The partial effects of income on SO2/c    
 
Figure 3: The partial effects of income on CO2/c 
 
4.1 Sensitivity analysis 
We test the existence of potential biases from omitted time-variant variables. 
Table 4 reports the results from estimating the effect of government expenditure 
under a series of relative correlation restrictions, using the method proposed by 
Krauth (2011). To account for country fixed-effects, each variable is expressed in 
terms of deviation from the corresponding country-level average. The results suggest 
that the estimated effect for SO2/c is robust, while the same does not hold for CO2/c, 
as expected. We find that for the effect on SO2/c to cease being strictly negative the 
correlation between government expenditure and unobservables would need to be 
6.25 times larger than the correlation with the observables, which seems highly 
unlikely. However, for CO2/c a relative correlation of only 40% or greater, implies 
that the point estimate of the effect includes zero and thus is not strictly negative. 
 
                        Table 4: Robustness checks for omitted variables bias 
Bounds on Government share effect by pollutant 
[θL(Λ), θH(Λ)] 
Relative correlation 
restriction (Λ) 
SO2/c CO2/c 
{0.00} -0.363** -0.025 
 (-0.645, -0.081) (-0.200, 0.151) 
[0.00, 0.50] [-0.457, -0.363] [-0.025, 0.006] 
 (-0.753, -0.110) (-0.189, 0.193) 
[0.00, 1.00] [-0.554, -0.363] [-0.025, 0.038] 
 (-0.921, -0.119) (-0.184, 0.271) 
[0.00, 5.00] [-1.634, -0.363] [-0.025, 0.353] 
 (-3.873, -0.120) (-0.181, 1.430) 
[0.00, 10.00] (-∞ ,∞ ) (-∞ ,∞ ) 
 (-∞ ,∞ ) (-∞ ,∞ ) 
λ 6.25 0.40 
Note: Bounds on the effect of government share of GDP on per capita 
pollution  emissions, given relative correlation restrictions. Intervals in 
square brackets are the bounds themselves, while the intervals in the 
round brackets are the Imbens-Manski 95% cluster-robust asymptotic 
confidence intervals. 
**Significant at 5% 
 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper, using a sample of 71 countries for the period 1970-2008 examines 
the effect of government size and income on pollution taking into account the 
dynamic nature of the relationships. Our results stress the importance of the long-
term effects of a change in income or government expenditure on pollution.  
The estimated direct effect of government expenditure is negative and 
significant for SO2, but insignificant for CO2. Estimation of a non-positive direct 
effect of government size on SO2 is in line with recent findings by Lopez et al. 
(2011) and Lopez and Palacios (2010). Specifically, the results suggest that the direct 
effect of government spending on pollution is insignificant and considerably smaller, 
in absolute values, for CO2. This finding may be explained by considering both 
pollutants’ impact on human health, as well as the technological capabilities of 
reducing their levels in the atmosphere. In particular, SO2 emissions externalities are 
local and immediate while CO2 emissions externalities are global and occur mostly 
in the future. Local environmental degradation, as in the case of SO2, increases 
demand for technological improvements to diminish that impact. The difference in 
magnitude and significance between the estimated direct effects of government 
expenditure on SO2 and CO2 could also be attributed to the different responsiveness 
of the pollutants to certain policies. In particular, the regulation of production 
generated pollutants, like SO2, is expected to be more straightforward and this is 
reflected in the estimated effects.   
Policy implications, occurring from the analysis, differ according to the level 
of income in a country. Many studies have shown that government size reduces 
prosperity (Folster and Henrekson, 2001; Bergh and Karlsson, 2010). However, 
cutting government expenditure should be undertaken with particular care in some 
levels of GDP. Combining our results with those of Halkos and Paizanos (2013), 
who also take into account the indirect effect of government expenditure on the 
environment through its impact on income, reducing government size in developing 
countries leads to deterioration of environmental quality. Therefore, cutting 
government expenditure in these countries should be accompanied by appropriate 
environmental regulation along with the establishment of international environmental 
treaties. On the other hand, in countries with higher income levels, cutting 
government expenditures leads to improvements in both income and environmental 
quality, while our results suggest that these effects are even greater in the long-run. 
In particular, countries with income level at the decreasing area of the EKC, i.e. 
developed countries, are more likely to have already established appropriate 
environmental legislation and to have undertaken public expenditures for the 
improvement of environmental quality, thus they are susceptible to diminishing 
returns from a further increase in government size. In that context, cutting out public 
spending items that increase market failure would be the most beneficial (Lopez et 
al., 2011).  
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